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Reconstructing patterns of interconnections from partial information is one of the most important
issues in the statistical physics of complex networks. A paramount example is provided by financial
networks. In fact, the spreading and amplification of financial distress in capital markets is strongly
affected by the interconnections among financial institutions. Yet, while the aggregate balance sheets
of institutions are publicly disclosed, information on single positions is mostly confidential and, as
such, unavailable. Standard approaches to reconstruct the network of financial interconnection
produce unrealistically dense topologies, leading to a biased estimation of systemic risk. Moreover,
reconstruction techniques are generally designed for monopartite networks of bilateral exposures
between financial institutions, thus failing in reproducing bipartite networks of security holdings
(e.g., investment portfolios). Here we propose a reconstruction method based on constrained entropy
maximization, tailored for bipartite financial networks. Such a procedure enhances the traditional
capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) and allows to reproduce the correct topology of the network. We
test this ECAPM method on a dataset, collected by the European Central Bank, of detailed security
holdings of European institutional sectors over a period of six years (2009-2015). Our approach
outperforms the traditional CAPM and the recently proposed MECAPM both in reproducing the
network topology and in estimating systemic risk due to fire-sales spillovers. In general, ECAPM
can be applied to the whole class of weighted bipartite networks described by the fitness model.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc; 89.65.Gh; 02.50.Tt
INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crises have highlighted the im-
portance of correctly evaluating systemic risk in finan-
cial markets, by explicitly considering the role played
by financial interconnections (both as direct expo-
sures through bilateral contracts and indirect exposures
through common assets holding [1–6]) in the spreading
of financial distress [7–11]. Thus, characterising the un-
derlying network structure of financial systems has be-
come not only a scientific but also an institutional prior-
ity [12–16]. However, while financial institutions have to
disclose their aggregated exposures (eventually split into
major categories), detailed data on their single positions
are generally confidential and, thus, unaccessible. For
this reason, reconstructing the network structure from
the available data has recently attracted much atten-
tion [17–29]. Yet, while several efforts have been devoted
so far to reconstruct monopartite networks of bilateral
exposures between financial institutions, methods to re-
construct the bipartite structure of assets ownership by
such institutions are still little explored [30]. Assessing
the portfolio composition of both financial actors and the
institutional sectors they belong to is, however, crucial
in terms of systemic stability. In fact portfolio overlaps
have the potential to trigger fire sales, i.e., downward
spirals for illiquid asset prices due to self-reinforcing sell
orders [31–35]. Fire sales spillovers are also dangerous
because they create incentives to hoard liquidity, thus ac-
tivating a spiral potentially leading to a complete freeze
of the financial system [36–41].
Reconstruction of monopartite networks of direct ex-
posures between financial institutions (such as interbank
markets) is typically pursued through dense maximum-
entropy techniques that use the available information as
constraints to be satisfied [17, 18]. The major drawback
of these approaches is however that of generating unre-
alistically (almost) fully-connected topologies which, in
turn, were shown to underestimate systemic losses due to
counterparty risk [19, 20]. Several techniques have thus
been developed to obtain sparse reconstructions [20, 22–
24] by inferring connection probabilities via the aggre-
gated exposures [25]. While these approaches either ex-
plore the whole range of possible network densities or
directly make use of ad-hoc density values, a recently
proposed bootstrapping algorithm allows one to obtain
an accurate guess of the true network density relying on
small, informative, subsets of nodes [42, 43]. The latter
approach has then been developed into a statistically-
grounded reconstruction procedure, which assesses con-
nection probabilities through a configuration model (CM)
[44, 45] tailored on the estimated density and induced
2by the aggregated exposures used as fitnesses [46, 47].
In order to evaluate the weights of connections, the
approach can be either complemented with a degree-
corrected gravity model (dcGM) [27] or with an enhanced
CM (ECM [48]) [28]. As pointed out by recent studies
[49, 50], this method outperforms other existing (proba-
bilistic) reconstruction techniques.
Differently from interbank markets, networks of insti-
tutional portfolio holdings are systems composed by two
classes of nodes: institutions (or sectors) and financial
instruments. In this case a reconstruction method has to
account for the bipartite structure of the system, since
connections are allowed only between nodes belonging to
different classes. Standard maximum entropy techniques
have been extended also to deal with such systems, gen-
erating candidate configurations according to the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM)—for which investors choose
their portfolio so that each position on a given asset is
proportional to that asset’s market capitalization [51, 52].
Recently, a cross-entropy maximization technique con-
straining weight expectations to match CAPM values
(MECAPM) has also been formalized [30]. Yet, both ap-
proaches predict very dense configurations, thus failing
in reproducing the real network structure, and eventu-
ally underestimating systemic risk arising from fire sales
spillovers [32] (although this may depend on the metric
chosen [30]).
In this paper we aim at overcoming the density is-
sue for bipartite networks reconstruction, by defining an
enhanced CAPM (ECAPM), which extends the fitness-
induced CM introduced for monopartite networks [27] to
the bipartite case. In a nutshell, the method consists of
a two-step inference procedure: first, links presence is as-
sessed through a bipartite CM (BiCM) [53] calibrated us-
ing the aggregated balance sheet data as fitnesses; then,
weights are estimated via the degree-corrected CAPM. To
validate our method, we use a unique dataset of security
holdings by institutional sectors in Europe (in particu-
lar, we have the detailed exposures of long-term secu-
rity bonds between sectors). Since we have full informa-
tion on these data (which is confidential and not publicly
available), we are able to precisely assess the accuracy of
our reconstruction method.
METHOD
Notation — We start by introducing the notation
that is used throughout the paper. Assets ownership
data are represented as a weighted, undirected, bipar-
tite network G0 of N investors portfolios and M assets.
The generic element of the N ×M biadjacency matrix,
wiα, is the value of asset α held by portfolio i. The
aggregated balance sheet information is thus given by
the nodes strengths, namely the market value of portfolio
i, Vi =
∑
α wiα, and the market capitalization of asset
α, Cα =
∑
iwiα. Connection patters are instead de-
scribed by the N ×M binary biadjacency matrix, whose
generic element aiα equals 1 if wiα > 0 and 0 otherwise.
Nodes degrees are then given by the number of differ-
ent assets held by each portfolio i, ki =
∑
α aiα, and by
the number of investors in each asset α, dα =
∑
i aiα.
W =
∑
iα wiα denotes the total economic value of the
system, and L =
∑
iα aiα is the total number of connec-
tions (ownership relations) in the network.
Problem statement — Suppose to have limited in-
formation on G0: we know the whole strength sequences
{Vi}Ni=1 and {Cα}Mα=1 and the total number of links L
(note that strengths are usually publicly available and,
thus, easy to access, whereas L is more difficult to ob-
tain and is typically proxied through density sampling or
bootstrapping techniques [42, 54]). In this situation, our
goal is to find the optimal estimate for X(G0), the value
of a generic property X measured on the real network G0
on the basis of the information available.
The ECAPM network reconstruction procedure works
in two main steps: it supposes G0 as drawn from an
appropriate ensemble Ω of bipartite graphs, defined by a
fitness-induced BiCM for links presence and by a degree-
corrected CAPM for links weight. In what follows, we
will label with the tilde symbol ∼ quantities of networks
drawn from Ω.
Topology reconstruction — If we knew the degree
of each node in the network, we could use the BiCM
[53] to directly generate Ω as the ensemble of binary,
undirected bipartite networks satisfying the degree con-
straints 〈ki〉Ω = ki(G0), i = 1 . . .N and 〈dα〉Ω = dα(G0),
α = 1 . . .M . This would imply a probability distribution
over Ω defined by a set of Lagrange multipliers {xi}Ni=1
and {yα}Mα=1 (one for each node) associated to the de-
grees, so that the connection probability between nodes
i and α is
piα ≡ 〈a˜iα〉Ω = xiyα
1 + xiyα
, (1)
independently for all nodes pairs. Here, however, we are
studying the case where node degrees are unknown, yet
we know the total number L of links. Thus, while we can-
not directly use the BiCM, we can resort to the fitness
ansatz, which assumes the network topology to be deter-
mined by intrinsic node properties named fitnesses. This
approach has been successfully used in the past to model
several economic and financial networks, by assuming a
proportionality between fitnesses and Lagrange multipli-
ers [47, 55, 56]. Thus, as in the case of monopartite finan-
cial networks [27, 28], we assume the strengths (which we
know) to represent node-specific fitnesses and be linearly
proportional to the BiCM Lagrange multipliers (induced
by degrees): xi ≡ √zV Vi, ∀i and yα ≡ √zCCα, ∀α.
Thanks to this assumption, our task reduces to determin-
ing only one proportionality constant, which is obtained
3by equating the ensemble average of the total number of
links with the (known) total number L of links of G0:
〈L〉Ω ≡
∑
i
∑
α
zViCα
1 + zViCα
= L(G0), (2)
where we have defined z =
√
zV zC . Eq. (2) is an algebraic
equation in z with a single positive solution, which is then
used to estimate the linking probabilities of eq. (1):
piα ≡ 〈a˜iα〉Ω = zViCα
1 + zViCα
∀(i, α). (3)
By preserving the network density, the topology pre-
dicted by eq. (3) generally differs substantially from the
one characterizing the fully, or very densely, connected
configurations predicted by the CAPM and MECAPM,
respectively.
Weights reconstruction — If the information on
nodes degrees were accessible, the formal approach to ob-
tain a weighted reconstructed network would prescribe to
use the ECM to maximize entropy, constraining both de-
grees and strengths. The observed degree sequence might
be in principle replaced by its estimate from the first step
of the method [28], yet this procedure becomes unfeasi-
ble for large networks, since it requires the solution of
2(N +M) coupled nonlinear equations. The alternative
approach that we follow here is to make use of the CAPM
framework, which can be seen as the bipartite counter-
part of the standard gravity model used for monopartite
networks [17, 19]. In its original version, CAPM assigns
weights as
ω˜iα = Vi Cα/W. (4)
As a result, the model reproduces the original strengths
sequence only when fully connected networks are con-
sidered. To account for a network topology determined
by nontrivial connection probabilities, we can extend the
dcGM prescription proposed in [27] to bipartite networks.
Weights of individual links are thus determined as:
w˜iα =
ViCα
Wpiα
a˜iα = (z
−1 + Vi Cα)
a˜iα
W
. (5)
Notably, this equation ensures that the expected values
of the reconstructed weights coincide with the CAPM
ones, 〈w˜iα〉Ω ≡ ω˜iα, ∀(i, α), thus preserving the strength
sequence on average, irrespectively from the underlying
reconstructed topology [28].
Remarks — To sum up, the set of connection prob-
abilities defined in eq. (3) and of link weights defined
in eq. (5) univocally determine the ensemble Ω, so that
the value of the generic quantity X in G0 can be esti-
mated as its ensemble average 〈X〉Ω. In the following,
we will show results of the ECAPM reconstruction pro-
cedure for a case study of security holdings by European
Sector Description
s 11 Non-financial corporations
s 121 The central bank
s 122 Deposit-taking corporations except the central bank
s 123 Money market funds (MMFs)
s 124 Non-MMF investment funds
s 125 Other financial intermediaries, except ICPFs
s 126 Financial auxiliaries
s 127 Captive financial institutions and money lenders
s 128 Insurance corporations (ICs)
s 129 Pension funds (PFs)
s 13 General government
s 14 Households (only in holders)
s 15 Non-profit insitutions serving households
s X Not allocated/unspecified
TABLE I. Institutional sector classification by the European
Central Bank.
institutional sectors, which we believe can be of interest
to both researchers and practitioners. A more exhaustive
analysis of ECAPM can be found in the Appendix, where
we show the analytic derivation of the model in the sparse
network limit, as well as a more general formulation us-
ing the continuous approximation of the fitness model (in
the latter case, we show how to write the expected values
of the quantities of interest in terms of moments of the
involved probability distributions).
Before moving further, let us explain the difference be-
tween the ECAPM and the MECAPM [30] reconstruc-
tion techniques (see the Appendix for further details).
Although both approaches predict average link weights
matching the CAPM values, MECAPM leads to connec-
tion probabilities of the form qiα = ω˜iα/(1 + ω˜iα), which
is the special case z = 1/W of eq. (3). These probabilities
then assume values very close to unity even for moder-
ately large weights. This is due to the very definition of
MECAPM, obtained by maximizing entropy constrain-
ing only the strength sequence (i.e., without accounting
for the network connectivity), a prescription which re-
distribute weights as evenly as possible—thus generating
very dense networks.
DATA
The dataset we use to test our reconstruction method
is based on the Security Holding Statistics (SHS) col-
lected by the European Central Bank. The data has
quarterly information on each individual security at the
country-sector level, covering a time span from 2009Q1 to
2015Q2, and is reported at the current euro value. Hold-
ing data include four types of financial tools: long-term
security bonds, short-term security bonds, money market
fund and equity. A distinctive feature of the dataset is
that the holding information is collected for each Inter-
national Securities Identification Number (ISIN).
To carry out our analysis, we focus on long-term secu-
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FIG. 1. Empirical cumulative distributions for the degrees of holders k (panel a) and of issuers d (panel c), and of the strengths
of holders V (panel b) and of issuers C (panel d), in the SHS dataset.
rity bonds and consider quarterly snapshots of the debt
exposure of 14 different institutional sectors, with stan-
dard ECB classification (see Table I), for each of the 19
European reporting countries. This results in a first layer
of N = 266 holders nodes, each corresponding to a spe-
cific country-sector combination. The second layer rep-
resents the issuers of the securities, where we aggregated
the specific ISINs to the same country-sector classifica-
tion, with the exception of the households (only 13 sec-
tors). Since the reporting countries are required to report
on any equity, with no limitation on the location of secu-
rity issuer, the second layer is composed of all the possi-
ble issuers nodes from 242 countries (including the 19 re-
porting countries) resulting in M = 3146 country-sector
combinations. Each link wiα thus corresponds to the
holdings of holder i (aggregated to the country-sector)
of the securities issued by issuer j (aggregated to the
country-sector).
Overall, we have 24 temporal snapshots (quarters) of
the data, bearing the complex networks signature of
broad degree and strength distributions (Fig. 1). No-
tice that dense reconstruction methods as CAPM and
MECAPM would not be able to replicate these hetero-
geneous topological features.
We remark that that the magnitude of the collected
holdings is substantial: for instance, total holdings by
countries belonging to the Euro area amount to around
18.3 trillion euro at the end of June 2014, thus represent-
ing a relevant share of the total financial system. While
the information on SHS marginals (e.g., the total asset of
a particular holder sector) is relatively easy to access, the
full availability of the SHS provides us with an unique op-
portunity to test the effectiveness of our method in recon-
structing the network structure of such an important and
large-scale financial system. For the sake of confidential-
ity, the analysis does not contain any explicit reference
to any specific country. Also, for the sake of readabil-
ity, in the following we report results only for the most
recent quarter of the dataset (2015Q2), yet our findings
are robust across all 24 quarterly snapshots.
RESULTS
We start by looking at the size of individual exposures
between holders and issuers, i.e., the weights of the exist-
ing links in the network. As already mentioned, ECAPM
weight expectations coincide with those of the original
CAPM and MECAPM defined in eq. (4). If we compare
such expectations with the real observed weights (Fig. 2),
we see that all reconstruction methods perform well in re-
producing the non-zero weights of the network. However,
weight uncertainties differ significantly between ECAPM
and MECAPM, as shown by the ratio of standard devi-
ations within the ensemble (see the Appendix):
rwiα =
σECAPMwiα
σMECAPMwiα
≃
√
1
piα
− 1. (6)
Since 90% or the rwiα coefficients are smaller than 1 in
our dataset, we can assert that ECAPM is more accurate
than MECAPM. Notice the key role played by the topol-
ogy in lowering the uncertainty of weights estimation:
rwiα < 1 is equivalent to piα > 1/2. The fact that such
a feature holds for country-sector holdings is also con-
sistent with our fitness model ansatz on the relationship
between node degrees and strengths.
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FIG. 2. Comparison between observed weights in the SHS
network and CAPM-predicted ones. The black line denotes
the identity.
Next, we preform a key test for the fitness ansatz of our
model (Fig. 3), showing that the strength-induced de-
grees {〈ki〉Ω}Ni=1 and {〈dα〉Ω}Mα=1 predicted by ECAPM
interpolate well the empirical values {ki(G0)}Ni=1 and
{dα(G0)}Mα=1, while MECAPM fails to a large extent.
This result supports the use of connection probabilities
defined by ECAPM as eq. (3). Then, to further assess
the effectiveness of our reconstruction method, we con-
sider three different families of indicators: topological,
statistical and financial ones.
Topological indicators aim at assessing whether a given
reconstruction method can effectively reproduce higher-
order features which are commonly regarded as most
significant for describing a network. Here we focus on
the average nearest neighbors degrees knn and dnn and
strengths V nn and Cnn [53], namely the arithmetic mean
of degrees and strengths of a node neighbors, respectively
(see the Appendix). In the context of SHS data, knn
(V nn) indicate how many exposures (the total portfo-
lio weight) holders have on average for a specific issuer,
while dnn (Cnn) indicate how many investors (the to-
tal amount of money invested) issuers have on average
for a specific holder. As Fig. 4 shows, our method cor-
rectly reproduces the observed decreasing trends, inter-
polating the clouds of points describing the real network.
Again, the MECAPM predicts flat trends which are not
compatible with the observed patterns, by systematically
over/under-estimating them.
Statistical indicators instead provide information on
the details of the reconstructed network structure. More
specifically, they quantify the ability to correctly pre-
dict the presence of individual links (i.e., the position
of ones in the binary biadjacency matrix) and their ab-
sence (i.e., the position of zeros). As explained in de-
tail in the Appendix, this is measured by the perfor-
mance of a binary classifier, thus using the usual per-
centages of true positives, true negatives, false positives
ECAPM MECAPM
True Positive Rate (TPR) 0.63 0.99
Specificity (SPC) 0.89 0.02
Positive Predicted Value (PPV) 0.63 0.24
Accuracy (ACC) 0.83 0.25
TABLE II. Values of statistical indicators quantifying the per-
formance of ECAPM and MECAPM in reproducing the de-
tails of the SHS network structure.
and false negatives. Table II reports four more infor-
mative combinations of such indices: true positive rate
(TPR), specificity (SPC), positive predicted value (PPV)
and accuracy (ACC). Note that while these numbers re-
fer to 2015Q2, they are remarkably stable across all 24
quarters of our dataset (Fig. A1). In order to cor-
rectly interpret the results provided in the table, we re-
call that while our ECAPM correctly replicates the ob-
served link-density c = LN ·M ≃ 0.24 (since 〈L〉Ω = L),
MECAPM returns a density of cMECAPM ≃ 0.98. As a
trivial consequence, the MECAPM correctly places al-
most all the 1s, obtaining a very high true positive rate
(TPR=0.99). However, this feature also represents a
major drawback. In fact, the percentage of correctly
recovered zeros is very low (SPC=0.02), pointing out
a strong bias towards false positives (whose percentage
amounts to FPR=1−SPC=0.98). Using the ROC curve,
which illustrates the performance of a binary classifier
as a point with coordinates (TPR,FPR) inside a unit
square—the better the classifier, the closer its point to
the (0,1) vertex—the point corresponding to MECAPM
lies at the top right corner, close to the identity line: this,
in turn, implies that its predictive power (PPV) equals
that of a random classifier based on the bipartite random
graph model (defined by the “homogeneous” assignments
piα ≡ p = LN ·M ∀i, α). Thus the MECAPM performance
in reproducing the SHS network structure is low, as con-
firmed by its small overall accuracy. In contrast, ECAPM
performs much more accurately, correctly recovering 63%
of the ones and 90% of zeros and thus achieving a much
higher predictive power.
Lastly, financial indicators provide information on how
systemic risk is estimated in the reconstructed ensemble.
Since we are in the context of bipartite networks of port-
folio holdings, here we focus on the risk stemming from
sales of illiquid assets and consequent losses during fire
sales. In particular, we follow [33] and use the systemic-
ness index Si as a measure of the impact of country-sector
i on the whole system:
Si =
ΓiVi
E
Biri, (7)
where Γi =
∑
jα(wjαlαwiα) is computed from the
illiquidity-weighted projection of the bipartite network,
lα is the illiquidity parameter of α, Bi and ri are the
leverage and portfolio return of country-sector i, and E
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FIG. 3. Empirical relation between strengths and degrees in the data (red points), superimposed with the prediction by ECAPM
(blue points) and MECAPM (green points), for both the layers of holders (panel a) and of issuers (panel b).
is the total equity in the system. Note that systemic-
ness as defined by eq. (7) is at the basis of more recent
and refined risk measures [34, 57, 58], which fully imple-
ment dynamical downward spirals of asset prices in the
system. Here, since our focus is on network reconstruc-
tion and not on systemic risk modeling, we refrain from
using such metrics which are more difficult to handle.
Yet, eq. (7) contains quantities which are not accessible
through the SHS data. To get rid of them, we can assume
homogeneous shocks in the system, as well as equal illiq-
uidity for the asset classes, in order to define the relative
systemicness
S˜i
Si(G0)
=
∑
jα w˜jαw˜iα∑
jα wjαwiα
. (8)
We can then use this quantity to test the reconstruction
procedures. After some algebra (reported in Appendix),
we find that ECAPM and MECAPM lead to the same
predictions in terms of ensemble average for the systemic-
ness. This is a natural consequence of weights expecta-
tions which coincide in the two algorithms. However,
when single instances of networks drawn from the cor-
responding reconstructed ensembles are considered, the
two methods again differ. Fig. 5 shows the relative sys-
temicness values scattered versus the holdings of country-
sectors. As for the reconstruction of individual weights,
the estimates provided by the two methods coincide for
the largest nodes. However, MECAPM tends to overesti-
mate the systemicness of small nodes. More importantly,
the two methods perform quite differently in estimating
the standard deviation of systemicness values. In par-
ticular, the standard deviations of the values shown in
Fig. 5 are ςMECAPM ≃ 2 · 104 and ςECAPM ≃ 10, and
the ratio of the standard deviations within the ensemble,
rSi = σ
ECAPM
Si
/σMECAPMSi , is smaller than 1 for 90% of
the nodes in the network. This is particularly relevant
in potential stress test applications, since the range of
variability of the index within the reconstructed ensem-
ble basically sets the scenarios to be considered: having
a small variability is desirable to focus on the most plau-
sible network configurations.
DISCUSSION
Reconstructing the properties of a network when only
partial information is available represents a key open
problem in the field of complex systems. Our proposed
solution points out that the accuracy of a reconstruction
method crucially depends on its ability to reproduce the
network topology (i.e., the presence of single links). In
fact, without enforcing any topological constraints (e.g.,
whenever only the strength sequence is enforced), the
number of connections is usually overestimated, caus-
ing an excess of false positives and, in turn, reducing
the predictive power of the reconstruction method. In-
deed, a method constraining only nodes strengths assigns
the same probability to all configurations with the same
strength sequence: since, as pointed out in previous con-
tributions [28, 48], the number of configurations satisfy-
ing these constraints is usually extremely large, the ac-
curacy of the achieved reconstruction is undermined.
The fundamental role played by topology clearly
emerges in the calculation of the errors affecting the es-
timates of quantities considered. In our case, both the
standard deviations for the weights and of the systemic-
ness index are defined in terms of linking probabilities.
Remarkably, lower errors are obtained in correspondence
of higher probabilities: according to our assumption, this
implies that bigger nodes establish more connections,
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which are in turn less affected by errors. This is rele-
vant especially in terms of systemic risk: bigger nodes are
also the most dangerous ones in case of severe losses or
default. However, although errors are sensitive to topo-
logical details, this is much less the case for the systemic-
ness index measure. S, in fact, ignores the node-specific
patterns of connections, being purely defined in terms of
links weights (see the Appendix). As a consequence, any
algorithm providing a satisfactory estimate of the latter
performs equally well, irrespectively of its performance
in reproducing the purely structural quantities (as the
presence of the links themselves). In our view, this can
represent a drawback of the S index to measure systemic
risk. Other measures, on the other hand, are sensitive to
topology [32, 59]. In particular, in [32] it is shown that
the probability of contagion in stock markets strongly de-
pends on connectivity, achieving the minimum value for
both the empty and the fully connected configurations
and the maximum value for intermediate values of the
link density (while the extent of the contagion is a mono-
tonic function of the density). In [59], on the other hand,
it is pointed out that portfolio heterogeneity affects the
extent and the coordination of feedback effects “trigger-
ing transition from stationary dynamics of price returns
to non-stationary ones characterized by a steep growth
(bubbles) and plunges (bursts) of market prices”. Indeed,
the analysis of historical data sets that also encompass
bubbles and crises represents the subject of future work.
By relying on the fitness model ansatz, ECAPM de-
fines a null model for bipartite weighted networks where
strengths replace degree constraints. When available, de-
grees can be directly used to define the topology using the
full BiCM approach [53]. If this is not the case, the appli-
cability of the method strongly depends on the accuracy
of the assumed functional relationship between strengths
and degrees. While the validity of the fitness ansatz can
be assessed by explicitly comparing nodes strengths and
degrees (whenever available), its rationale rests upon a
simple argument, corroborated by the analysis of other
economic and financial networks [27, 28, 47, 55, 56]: the
higher the importance of a node, the larger we expect
its degree to be. Indeed, our method can be applied
to any weighted bipartite network for which this argu-
ment applies. Similarly, the factorization of any graph
probability into the product of single link probabilities
characterizing the ECAPM model could be perceived as
inherently inadequate to reproduce the real network pat-
terns. Although this may indeed be the cause of the
residual deviations between the actual network values
and the reconstructed ones, we emphasize that the in-
dependence of link probabilities is not postulated by us
at any stage: rather, it emerges naturally from the en-
forcement of purely local constraints (be they degrees
or strengths). Put differently, the unbiased solution to
the inference problem prescribes to consider independent
probabilities. Paradoxically, introducing (more realistic)
dependencies would result in a biased inference, if start-
ing from the same observational constraints.
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FIG. 5. Relative systemicness index S˜i/Si(G0) of the various
country-sectors as estimated by ECAPM and MECAPM for
a particular configuration drawn from the corresponding en-
sembles. Averages are shown for both methods as horizontal
solid lines.
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APPENDIX
The MECAPM method
MECAPM (maximum-entropy capital-asset pricing
model) combines the constrained entropy-maximization
(ME) technique and the single weights estimation wiα
from the CAPM model [30], which reads
〈wiα〉CAPM = ViCα
W
∀(i, α). (A1)
This is achieved using the exponential random graph the-
oretical framework [44, 45]. Indeed, the CAPM model
can be understood as prescribing to constrain the whole
set of weights of a given weighted undirected bipartite
network G0. In this particular case, the probability dis-
tribution over the ensemble factorizes into the product of
pair-specific geometric probability distributions
P (G0) =
∏
i
∏
α
qwiαiα (1− qiα). (A2)
The generic weight wiα is interpreted as the sum of uni-
tary links, each one behaving as an independent Bernoulli
random variable. Each pair-specific probability distribu-
tion is thus characterized by a quantity qiα, describing
the probability that nodes i and α are connected.
The N · M unknown parameters qiα (i = 1 . . .N ,
α = 1 . . .M) are estimated by exploiting the likelihood
conditions [45]
〈wiα〉CAPM = qiα
1− qiα ∀(i, α); (A3)
as a result, one obtains
qiα =
〈wiα〉CAPM
1 + 〈wiα〉CAPM =
ViCα/W
1 + ViCα/W
∀(i, α). (A4)
Note that the probability coefficients described by eq.
(A4) solely depend on the (estimated) weights magni-
tude: as a consequence, the larger the value 〈wiα〉,
the larger the probability that nodes i and α are con-
nected. Since weights are typically large, the MECAPM
method is likely to predict very dense configurations. For
what concerns the SHS dataset considered in the present
work, although link probabilities range in the interval
[5 · 10−5, 1], their distribution is characterized by an
average value of q ≃ 0.97 and a standard deviation of
10
σq ≃ 0.091. Their variation coefficient is σq/q ≃ 0.093,
indicating that the average faithfully represents the dis-
tribution of values (which, practically, coincide with a
delta peaked at 1).
The ECAPM method
Differently from MECAPM, the ECAPM algorithm
features a correction term 1/z that accounts for the over-
all network link density. For the SHS dataset, probability
coefficients computed by ECAPM range in the interval
[10−12, 1], their average value is p ≃ 0.01 (coinciding with
the network density of links) and their standard devia-
tion is σp ≃ 0.057. Their variation coefficient is σp/p > 5,
indicating that the average is not representative of the
distribution of values, which is thus rather spread over
the corresponding support.
The key ingredient of ECAPM is to quantify the ten-
dency of any two nodes of establishing a connection, by
assuming the former to depend on the nodes fitness and
on the (observed) total number of links. The way in
which the ECAPM method works can be better illus-
trated by considering two special cases which are analyt-
ically tractable.
Sparse networks. When considering low-density net-
works, the probability coefficients can be assumed to be
“small”. Let us, thus, assume that the Taylor expansion
(around z0 = 0) of any coefficient can be truncated to
the first order:
piα =
zViCα
1 + zViCα
= zViCα − (zViCα)2 + (zViCα)3 . . .
≃ zViCα. (A5)
In this case, z can be estimated by imposing 〈L〉 =∑
i
∑
α piα = L, which leads to z = L/W
2, further im-
plying piα = L(ViCα/W
2). The latter expression high-
lights that any two nodes are connected with a probabil-
ity that is a fraction of the total number of links, properly
normalized by the percentage of the total weight repre-
sented by the two involved nodes strengths. Analogously,
when calculating quantities like nodes degrees, one finds
that 〈ki〉 =
∑
α piα = Vi(L/W ) and 〈dα〉 =
∑
i piα =
Cα(L/W ).
The continuous approximation. In the sparse case,
the empirical distributions of strengths are directly pro-
portional to the empirical distributions of degrees. As
a consequence, a scale-free distribution of the former in-
duces a scale-free distribution of the latter. Such an evi-
dence can be used to gain insight into ECAPM also in the
general case: upon assuming nodes fitnesses (i.e., nodes
strengths) to be drawn from well-defined probability dis-
tributions, V ∼ pi(V ) and C ∼ ρ(C), it is enough to re-
place each sum with an integral over the aforementioned
distributions. As an example, the formula for computing
the degree of portfolio i, 〈ki〉 =
∑
α piα, becomes
〈ki〉(z, V ) =M
∫
C
(
zViC
1 + zViC
)
ρ(C)dC (A6)
with C representing the support of the distribution. By
inserting the Taylor expansion in eq. (A5) into eq. (A6)
we get:
〈ki〉(z, Vi)= M
∫
C
(
zViC
1 + zViC
)
ρ(C)dC =
= M
∫
C
[zViC − (zViC)2 + (zViC)3 . . . ]ρ(C)dC =
= M [zViµ1 − (zVi)2µ2 + (zVi)3µ3 . . . ], (A7)
offering a recipe for calculating the numerical value of the
statistics of interest, via the computation of the (raw)
moments of the involved distributions. As a last com-
ment, note that the formulas for the sparse case is ob-
tained by retaining only the first term in eq. (A7), and
requiring that the first moment of ρ(C) can be estimated
by invoking the likelihood-maximization principle, i.e.,
µ = C = (
∑
α Cα)/M =W/M .
Weights estimation
As stated in the main text, the ensemble averages
of weights under the MECAPM and ECAPM coincide.
However, the corresponding statistical fluctuations differ:
σ2, ECAPMwiα = 〈wiα〉2CAPM
[
1
piα
− 1
]
, (A8)
σ2,MECAPMwiα = 〈wiα〉CAPM(1 + 〈wiα〉CAPM). (A9)
This implies
rwiα =
σECAPMwiα
σMECAPMwiα
=
=
〈wiα〉2CAPM
〈wiα〉CAPM(1 + 〈wiα〉CAPM)
√
1
piα
− 1 =
≃
√
1
piα
− 1, (A10)
a ratio that is (strictly) smaller than 1 whenever piα >
1/2.
Testing the reconstruction methods
In order to test the performance of both ECAPM and
MECAPM in reconstructing the network, we have con-
sidered topological, statistical and financial indicators.
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Topological indicators
The first family of indicators consists of quantities pro-
viding information on the global, structural organization
of a given network. For what concerns the network bi-
nary structure, we have considered i) the degree of, re-
spectively, holders and issuers, ki(A) =
∑M
α=1 aiα and
dα(A) =
∑N
i=1 aiα and ii) the average nearest neighbors
degree of holders and issuers [53]:
dnni (A) =
∑M
α=1 aiαdα
ki
, knnα (A) =
∑N
i=1 aiαki
dα
(A11)
We compared these values with their expected counter-
parts, i.e., 〈ki〉 =
∑M
α=1〈aiα〉, 〈dα〉 =
∑N
i=1〈aiα〉 and
〈dnni 〉 =
∑M
α=1〈aiα〉〈dα〉
〈ki〉 , 〈k
nn
α 〉 =
∑N
i=1〈aiα〉〈ki〉
〈dα〉 .
(A12)
Note that, for ECAPM in the sparse case, it is 〈dnni 〉 ≃
(L/W 2)
∑
α C
2
α and 〈knnα 〉 ≃ (L/W 2)
∑
i V
2
i , i.e., the ex-
pected value of the average nearest neighbors degree of
holders and issuers is constant for all nodes belonging to
the same layer. The predictions by MECAPM, on the
other hand, can be obtained by considering a very dense
network, i.e., 〈aiα〉 = qiα ≃ 1. In this case, we obtain
〈knnα 〉MECAPM ≃M − 1 and 〈dnni 〉MECAPM ≃ N − 1.
For what concerns the weighted structure of the net-
work, we have considered the average nearest neighbors
strengths
Cnni (W) =
∑M
α=1 aiαCα
ki
, V nnα (W) =
∑N
i=1 aiαVi
dα
(A13)
and compared them with their expected counterparts
〈Cnni 〉 =
∑M
α=1〈aiα〉Cα
〈ki〉 , 〈V
nn
α 〉 =
∑N
i=1〈aiα〉Vi
〈dα〉 . (A14)
As for the average nearest neighbors degrees, in the
sparse case ECAPM predicts flat trends for all nodes be-
longing to the same layer: 〈Cnni 〉 ≃ (
∑
α C
2
α)/W and
〈knnα 〉 ≃ (
∑
i V
2
i )/W . MECAPM predictions are in-
stead obtained by again considering a very dense net-
work: 〈V nnα 〉MECAPM ≃ W/(N − 1), 〈Cnni 〉MECAPM ≃
W/(M − 1).
Statistical indicators
Statistical indicators are compactly represented by the
so-called confusion matrix, a 4 × 4 matrix whose entries
represent the number of true positives, true negatives,
false positives and false negatives. Let us briefly explain
why these concepts are useful for our analysis.
Reconstructing a network G0 means providing an al-
gorithm to estimate the presence and the weight of the
connections. If we limit our analysis to the binary struc-
ture only (represented by the binary matrix A, with
aiα = Θ[wiα]), this implies “guessing” the topological
structure of the network, namely the position of 0s and
1s in the matrix. For each entry of the considered bi-
adjacency matrix, four different cases are possible: a)
aiα = 1 and we correctly predict a˜iα = 1. When this
is the case, we have a true positive; b) aiα = 1 but we
predict a˜iα = 0. In this case, we have a false negative; c)
aiα = 0 and we correctly predict a˜iα = 0. In this case, we
have a true negative; d) aiα = 0 but we predict a˜iα = 1.
When this is the case, we have a false positive.
Given the observed biadjacency matrix A and the re-
constructed matrix A˜, we can straightforwardly count
the total number of true positives as the point-wise prod-
uct of the two matrices
TP =
∑
i
∑
α
aiαa˜iα (A15)
(whose generic addendum is one iff both aij = 1 and
a˜ij = 1), the total number of false negatives as
FN =
∑
i
∑
α
aiα(1 − a˜iα) = L(G0)− TP (A16)
(where L(G0) is total number of observed links), the total
number of true negatives as
TN =
∑
i
∑
α
(1−aiα)(1−a˜iα) = N ·M−L˜−L(G0)+TP
(A17)
(whose generic addendum is one iff both aij = 0 and
a˜ij = 0), and the total number of false positives as
FP =
∑
i
∑
α
(1−aiα)a˜iα = L˜−TP = (N ·M−L(G0))−TN
(A18)
whose first addendum is the number of 0s in the real
matrix A.
The information provided by TP , FN , TN , FP is
usually given by combinations of them. Sensitivity (or
true positive rate) is defined as
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
=
TP
L(G0)
(A19)
and quantify the percentage of 1s that are correctly re-
covered by a reconstruction method. Specificity (or true
negative rate) is defined as
SPC =
TN
FP + TN
=
TN
N ·M − L(G0) (A20)
and quantifies the percentage of 0s that are correctly re-
covered by a reconstruction method. The false positive
rate, defined as FPR = 1 − SPC, is usually compared
to TPR in order to evaluate the performance of a given
algorithm with respect to a random classifier. In fact,
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whenever TPR and FPR coincide, the performance of
the considered model equals that of a random classifier
(in other words, the model representative point lies on
the identity line of the ROC curve). Precision (or posi-
tive predicted value) is defined as
PPV =
TP
TP + FP
(A21)
and measures the performance of an algorithm in cor-
rectly placing the 1s with respect to the total number of
predicted 1s. Finally, accuracy is
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
=
TP + TN
N ·M (A22)
and measures the overall performance of a reconstruction
method in correctly placing both 1s and 0s.
Since both the ECAPM and the MECAPM methods
deal with an entire ensemble of candidate matrices A˜,
we are interested in estimating the expected values of the
aforementioned indices. Their ensemble averages are re-
ported in Table A1. For the sake of illustration, let us
explicitly derive them for the ECAPM method in the
sparse regime and for the MECAPM method, below.
By resting upon the continuous approximation, the ex-
pected number of true positives for ECAPM is
〈TP 〉 = L(G0)
∫
V
∫
C
p(V,C)ρ(C)pi(V )dCdV =
≃ L(G0)
∫
V
∫
C
(zV C)ρ(C)pi(V )dCdV =
= L(G0)zλµ = L(G0)
2/(N ·M), (A23)
where we have truncated the analytical expression of
p(V,C) at the first order and estimated the first raw mo-
ment of the two distributions as λ = V = W/N and
µ = C = W/M . In the same regime of eq. (A23),
〈TPR〉 = L(G0)/(N ·M), i.e., the expected sensitivity
coincides with the link density.
In the case of MECAPM, instead, TPR and FPR prac-
tically coincide (see Table II). This implies
〈TPR〉 = 1− 〈SPC〉 (A24)
⇒ 〈TP 〉
Ltrue
=
〈L〉 − 〈TP 〉
N ·M − Ltrue
⇒ 〈TP 〉〈L〉 = 〈PPV 〉 =
L(G0)
N ·M ,
i.e., the MECAPM predictive power coincides with the
network link density, which is the PPV of the random
graph model.
Interestingly, the performance of ECAPM method in
the sparse case and that of MECAPM in recovering the
correct number of 1s are very similar (as confirmed by
their close PPV values). However, in the regime of
eq. (A23), the expected accuracy for ECAPM reads
〈ACC〉 ≃ 1 + 2L(G0)/(N ·M), which can be quite large
if the network is very sparse. In other words, the overall
accuracy of ECAPM in reconstructing sparse networks
can still be large, the reason lying in the large number of
0s correctly recovered.
Financial indicators
The third family of indicators aim at quantifying the
systemicness of nodes belonging to a financial network.
We follow [33] and adopt the systemicness index Si:
Si =
ΓiVi
E
Biri (A25)
which can be compared with its expected counterpart
〈Si〉 via the ratio 〈Si〉/Si. After some algebraic manipu-
lations [30], such a ratio can be rewritten as
〈Si〉
Si
=
∑
j
∑
α〈wiαwjα〉∑
j
∑
α wiαwjα
=
∑
α〈w2iα〉+
∑
j 6=i〈wiα〉〈wjα〉∑
α wiαCα
.
(A26)
For ECAPM, this ratio can be further simplified upon
considering that 〈wiα〉 = ViCαW and 〈w2iα〉 =
(
ViCα
Wpiα
)2
piα,
which leads to the expression
〈Si〉ECAPM
Si
=
∑
α
(
ViCα
Wpiα
)2
piα +
ViCα
W
[
Cα − ViCαW
]
∑
α wiαCα
.
(A27)
In the case of MECAPM instead we have
〈wiα〉MECAPM = ViCαW and 〈w2iα〉MECAPM =
ViCα
W
(
1 + 2ViCαW
)
, which leads to the expression
〈Si〉MECAPM
Si
=
∑
α
ViCα
W
[
1 + Cα +
ViCα
W
]∑
α wiαCα
. (A28)
Since, in both cases, the term
ViC
2
α
W dominates over
the other ones and 〈wiα〉ECAPM = 〈wiα〉MECAPM =
〈wiα〉CAPM, we have
〈Si〉ECAPM
Si
≃ 〈Si〉MECAPM
Si
≃
∑
α
ViC
2
α
W∑
α wiαCα
=
=
∑
α〈wiα〉CAPMCα∑
α wiαCα
. (A29)
Eq.(A29) implies that, among the reconstruction
methods satisfying the strength constraints, those which
are expected to better reproduce the systemicness in-
dex are the ones better reproducing the observed
weights. As discussed in the main text, the prescrip-
tion 〈wiα〉ECAPM = 〈wiα〉MECAPM = ViCαW is particularly
successful in reproducing the largest weights of the SHS
network (beside ensuring that 〈Cα〉 = Cα).
The statistical fluctuations affecting the Si index are
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ECAPM MECAPM
〈TP 〉ECAPM =
∑
i
∑
α
aiαpiα 〈TP 〉MECAPM ≃ L(G0)
〈TN〉ECAPM =
∑
i
∑
α
(1− aiα)(1− piα) = N ·M − 2L(G0) + 〈TP 〉 〈TN〉MECAPM ≃ 0
〈FP 〉ECAPM = (N ·M − L(G0))− 〈TN〉ECAPM = L(G0)− 〈TP 〉ECAPM 〈FP 〉MECAPM ≃ N ·M − L(G0)
〈FN〉ECAPM = L(G0)− 〈TP 〉ECAPM 〈FN〉MECAPM ≃ 0
〈TPR〉ECAPM = 〈TP 〉ECAPM/L(G0) 〈TPR〉MECAPM ≃ 1
〈FPR〉ECAPM =
L(G0)−〈TP 〉ECAPM
N·M−L(G0)
〈FPR〉MECAPM ≃ 1
〈SPC〉ECAPM =
〈TN〉ECAPM
N·M−L(G0)
= 1− 〈FPR〉ECAPM 〈SPC〉MECAPM ≃ 0
〈PPV 〉ECAPM =
〈TP 〉ECAPM
〈TP 〉ECAPM+〈FP 〉ECAPM
= 〈TP 〉ECAPM
L(G0)
〈PPV 〉MECAPM ≃
L(G0)
N·M
= c(G0)
〈ACC〉ECAPM =
〈TP 〉ECAPM+〈TN〉ECAPM
N·M
= 1− 2c(G0) + 2
〈TP 〉ECAPM
N·M
〈ACC〉MECAPM ≃ c(G0)
TABLE A1. Statistical indicators used to evaluate the performance of ECAPM and MECAPM in reproducing the observed
network structure.
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FIG. A1. Performance of ECAPM (panel a) and MECAPM (panel b) measured by statistical indicators across the time span
of the SHS dataset.
σ2,MECAPMSi =
∑
α
〈wiα〉
[
(1 + 2〈wiα〉)
∑
j
〈wjα〉2 + Cα(1 + Cα) + Cα〈wiα〉(2 + Cα)
]
(A30)
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σ2, ECAPMSi =
∑
α
〈wiα〉2
piα
[∑
j
〈wjα〉2
pjα
+ C2α(1− piα)−
∑
j
〈wjα〉2
]
. (A31)
Interestingly enough, plotting the vector of ratios
rSi =
σECAPMSi
σMECAPMSi
(A32)
versus the nodes strengths Vi reveals a functional depen-
dency rSi ∝ V −1/2i . Again, this confirms that ECAPM
outperforms MECAPM in providing an estimate of the
systemicness index Si for the larger institutions, which
become less sensitive to statistical fluctuations.
